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[Dr. Robinson, a sociologist and journalist, is Research Associate at the Center for International
Studies of the Central American University in Managua, Nicaragua. The following article is based
on ideas developed in his forthcoming book, "Promoting Polyarchy: US Intervention, Globalization
and Hegemony in the 21st Century, A Gramscian Analysis."]
In 1930, the US Governor in Haiti under the Marine occupation reported: "In general, while the
Anglo-Saxon has a...profound conviction of the value of democratic government, Haitians are
unsuitable for democracy," because, "in common with the Latin in general, [Haitians] are in the
main directed by emotion rather than by reason," and therefore "apt to scorn democracy." Sixtyfour years later, despite its euphemistic baptism as "Operation Support Democracy," a new US
military intervention in Haiti has little to do with restoring democracy to that Caribbean island
nation. The current occupation is the logical and predictable continuation of a decade-long policy
toward Haiti whose fundamental objective has been to thwart and defuse a mass movement for
authentic popular democratization.
US intervention in Latin America in the name of defending democracy is certainly not new. Most
post-World War II military interventions in the hemisphere have been conducted under such
a pretext, including the 1965 invasion of the Dominican Republic, the 1989 invasion of Panama,
and the 1979- 1990 war against Nicaragua. And it was in the name of democracy that US Marines
invaded Haiti in 1915 and remained as an occupation force until 1934. However, US policy toward
Haiti, including the current occupation, is many times more complex than earlier US interventions
in the hemisphere, and at first blush does appear to constitute a defense of democracy.
The intervention has been conducted for the stated purpose of restoring to office deposed
president Jean Bertrand Aristide, the immensely popular adherent of liberation theology who was
democratically elected in 1990. US Marines are detaining and disarming hated paramilitary forces,
and dismantling strategic Haitian army units. Aristide officials and opponents of the military regime
have returned from exile or emerged from hiding under the armed protection of the Marines. And
downtrodden Haitian masses have taken to the streets to welcome the foreign force as a liberator.
What is taking place in Haiti, however, is a momentary and tactical convergence between Haiti's
impoverished masses and US policy-makers. Both Washington and the Haitian masses want to
get rid of the military regime that overthrew Aristide in the September 1991 coup d'etat, and this
common objective forms the basis for a tactical convergence that has made it appear that the US is
on the side of democracy in Haiti.
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Yet beyond the immediate goal of removing the de facto military rulers and formally restoring
Aristide to office, each side is, in fact, pursuing antagonistic and diametrically opposed projects for
Haitian society. On the one hand, Washington seeks, through the occupation, to place back on track
the policy it has been pursuing for the past decade of trying to modernize the traditional structures
of power and stabilize an elite social order in Haiti. On the other hand, the Haitian masses have
been sparked by the intervention to reinvigorate their own struggle for fundamental changes in the
entire social order, one of the most unjust and oppressive in the hemisphere.
To understand the current occupation one must go back to the late 1970s and early 1980s and
analyze changes in US foreign policy and developments in Haiti. From Dictatorship to Low Intensity
Democracy The Haitian military occupation is the most recent and perhaps the most complex
manifestation of the unfolding post- Cold War US strategy of political intervention in developing
countries under the rubric of "democracy promotion." As the dominant world power, the US
promoted and supported a string of authoritarian states and dictatorships in the Third World in
the aftermath of World War II. This was not out of any propensity for dictatorship, but rather a cold
calculation that such arrangements were the best means of achieving stability. In Latin America, the
products of this strategy were the Somozas, the Trujillos, the Stroessners, the generals in Guatemala,
El Salvador, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile, and, of course, the Duvaliers in Haiti, who for nearly 30
years enjoyed Washington's backing. But, while authoritarianism proved adept in the short run at
maintaining the social control necessary to protect US investments and geopolitical interests, it also
tended to generate mass resistance and pressures for fundamental social change, leading to popular
revolts, political crises, and even occasional revolutions.
The Iranian and Nicaraguan revolutions of 1979 were compelling events that brought home to
policy-makers the fragility of a policy of relying on authoritarianism to defend strategic US interests
in the Third World. Between 1979 and the mid-1980s, US officials developed and launched their
"democracy promotion" policy as an alternative to supporting authoritarianism. The objective of
"democracy promotion" operations are two-fold: to replace dictatorships and military governments
with elite civilian governments, and simultaneously to suppress the project of popular sectors for
more thorough-going social, economic, political, and cultural transformation of their societies. In
these "transitions to democracy," such as took place in the Philippines with the ouster of Ferdinand
Marcos, in Chile with the removal of Augusto Pinochet, and in Paraguay with the removal of Alfredo
Stroessner, the US employed a host of new policy instruments. These included limited economic
sanctions, the use or the threat to use military force, diplomatic pressures, and the deployment
of "political aid" programs through the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), the Agency
for International Development (AID), the CIA, and other agencies, all in an effort to assure that
mass movements against dictatorships would not snowball into popular social- change projects. US
political aid programs are a relatively new feature of foreign policy. They are aimed at cultivating
elites with a technocratic outlook and a commitment to free market capitalism along the lines of the
neoliberal model, and at developing broad constituencies around these "modernizing" elites.
Political aid programs function by providing monies, training, and professional guidance to political
parties, civic associations, trade unions, and other groups whose leaders are then expected both
to displace the older authoritarian elites and autocrats, and to compete with popular classes
and eclipse their alternative popular projects. The type of "democracy" that the US attempts to
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impose through this policy is known in academic circles as polyarchy, a system whereby a small
elite actually rules and mass participation in decision-making is confined to choosing leaders in
elections that are carefully managed by competing elites. In more commonplace terms, the US is
now promoting "low-intensity democracy."
In distinction to dictatorship, polyarchy or low-intensity democracy is better able to relieve
pressure for more radical change and provide an institutional framework more conducive than
authoritarianism to free market economic reform along the neoliberal model. Both dictatorship and
low-intensity democracy are opposed to notions of popular democracy, which posit not only deeper
forms of participatory democracy, but also social justice, economic equality, national sovereignty,
and the democratization of international relations, including the international economic order. In
line with this policy shift, Washington has been following since the early 1980s a complex cat and
mouse game in Haiti to bring about a transition from the authoritarian structures of the past to a
modernized civilian elite "democracy." The strategy has meant subduing the highly organized,
politicized and mobilized Haitian masses, while at the same time opposing the authoritarian
practices and tendencies of the Haitian elite.
Low-intensity democracy projects promoted with remarkable success in the Philippines, Chile,
Paraguay, Nicaragua, and elsewhere have proven deeply elusive in Haiti for a host of reasons
particular to that country's unique history and sociopolitical landscape. The Haitian Background:
A Weak Elite and US Domination In 1804, Haitian slaves staged a successful revolt against French
planation owners. Within two decades, however, a tiny elite made up of the mulattoes, who were
free under French colonialism, and a tiny black upper and middle class, came to dominate the
government and monopolize the nation's wealth. From independence until the 1980s, government
and politics in Haiti can be summed up as permanent internecine struggles for power and the spoils
of state among competing factions of the tiny and immensely wealthy Haitian elite. In the process
of intraelite conflict and accommodation, the armed forces have sided with one or another faction,
depending on which could offer the most spoils to military officers. The army thus had the power to
tip the balance between elite cliques and became a key player in the politics of power. Meanwhile,
the Haitian masses, locked out of any participation in the political life of the country, have for the
most part conducted their struggles outside of the formal structures of power.
The US, by showing only contempt for the black republic, complicated the problem of a fractious,
underdeveloped, and authoritarian elite. The white government in Washington, which maintained
the US slave system for nearly 60 years after Haiti won its independence, responded to the newborn
Haitian republic with a policy of isolation and nonrecognition. When official relations were
finally established in 1886, the black diplomat sent by Port-au-Prince to represent Haiti in the
US was deemed socially unacceptable and was instructed by the State Department to remain in
New York rather than Washington D.C. Over the next several decades, Haiti acquired strategic
importance for the nascent US empire because of the Windward Passage, a waterway shared
with Cuba and considered vital to Caribbean and eastern US sea lanes. Between 1857 and 1913
US Navy ships entered Haitian ports 19 times to "protect American lives and property." In 1915
US Marines invaded the tiny republic as part of Washington's efforts to displace the Spanish and
other European competitors as the dominant power in the Caribbean. At least 3,000 Haitians died
fighting the US Marines, who stayed on for 19 years. "The Haitians are Negro for the most part,
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and, barring a very few highly educated politicians, are almost in a state of savagery and complete
ignorance," wrote a senior State Department official in 1921. Therefore, "in Haiti it is necessary to
have as complete a rule within a rule by Americans as possible."
Operating with a vicious racism not felt in the country since the defeat of Napoleon's army, and
with little understanding of the nation's peculiar history and social makeup, the occupation forces
assembled political structures responsive to outside interests that only complicated internal
political development and perpetuated Haiti's misery. The US dismantled the old army and created
a new gendarmerie staffed by mulatto officers who, upon withdrawal of the Marines, became
the repressive and corrupt regulator of power and guardian of elite interests. Through cunning
manipulation of the inauspicious blend of local politics and US power, Francois ("Papa Doc")
Duvalier worked his way into power. In 1957, he was elected president, and soon after declared
himself "President for Life," promising a stable alliance between the black and mulatto elite and
foreign interests, with the blessing and active support of Washington. When the ailing Duvalier's
hand-chosen successor, his 19- year-old son Jean-Claude ("Baby Doc"), was sworn in upon his
father's death in 1971 and appointed as the second "President for Life," the US ambassador in
attendance, Clinton Knox, greeted the new teenage head of state by calling for an increase in aid
to Haiti, while two US Navy warships stood offshore from Port-au-Prince to assure an orderly
transfer of power. US economic and military aid continued throughout the duration of the regime,
even under the Carter administration despite its human rights policy. "Preventative Diplomacy" to
Remove the Duvaliers
Meanwhile, popular protest against the Duvalier dictatorship grew throughout the 1970s and earlier
1980s. As protests snowballed into a civic uprising, it became clear that the days of Duvalierism were
numbered. In 1985, Washington quietly switched policy, turning from supporting the authoritarian
regime to organizing a "transition to democracy." The first stage in Washington's "transition" was
known as "preventative diplomacy" and consisted of the orderly removal of Duvalier. By February
1986, with millions of Haitians staging a popular uprising in civil society, US embassy operatives
quietly convinced Baby Doc to go into exile. They then hand-picked the members of an interim
government and negotiated with the army the same army whose removal from power is now being
negotiated by US policy-makers to take over the affairs of state and assure an orderly transition until
a new polyarchic system could be installed. The second stage was to cultivate a modernized Haitian
elite through a host of economic and political programs under the rubric of "democracy promotion."
The goal was to place this elite in power through elections organized and overseen by Washington,
and at the same time, wrest influence from mass popular organizations that were already flourishing
in civil society and demanding radical change in Haiti.
Implementing the US project for Haiti was not easy. On the one hand, the Haitian elite was
historically weak and underdeveloped. It was steeped in corruption, an authoritarian political
culture, and the perennial pursuit of personal and family self-interest, all of which posed huge
obstacles to a coherent or unified elite project for Haiti. On the other hand, the popular sectors,
emboldened by the departure of Duvalier and a newfound sense of power, demonstrated a burst
of creativity and grassroots activity. Thousands of popular community councils sprung up in
slums throughout Port-au-Prince and other cities, engaging in political organization, human rights
activities, adult literacy and education, and self-help projects.
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In the countryside, peasant leagues which had been organizing since the 1970s, now burgeoned,
demanding land, credits, the removal of local bosses, and so forth. Between 1985 and 1990, the US
National Endowment for Democracy spent at least US$12 million dollars in "democracy promotion"
programs in Haiti. Funds went to political parties of the elite, to a small conservative trade union
that competed with the popular trade union movement, and to several think tanks and human rights
organizations that promoted the project of a transition to polyarchy and modernizing the political
system. The mass organizations of the popular sectors were completely and conspicuously bypassed
in these "democracy" programs. Another part of the US program was economic assistance, which
jumped from US$55.6 million in 1985 to US$77.7 million in 1986 and US$101.1 million in 1987, and
which was intended to benefit the business class within the elite.
Bolstering and modernizing the civilian elite went together with a program to preserve and actually
strengthen the military and the police through a security assistance program run by the Defense
Department and the CIA. Within two weeks of Duvalier's exit, the United States gave the military
government US$500,000 in riot gear. In July 1986, Congress approved US$4 million dollars in
"nonlethal" military aid to the Haitian army, including the "nonlethal" night sticks and tear gas
which the police and army have used skillfully against pro-democracy Haitian demonstrators. In
early 1987, the Pentagon sent in 20 military advisors. Simultaneously, the CIA set up and funded a
National Intelligence Service (SIN) in the Haitian military. When this covert program was revealed
several years later in 1993, CIA officials claimed the unit was intended to fight narcotics trafficking.
Yet narcotics trafficking, which had become rampant under Baby Doc, was run mostly by the
military itself and leaders of the SIN were also central figures in the drug trade. In practice, the SIN
acted as an instrument of political repression and as a channel for establishing contacts between
Washington and key military and political figures in the post- Duvalier political landscape.
These same figures would emerge as important leaders and supporters of the 1991 coup against
the Aristide government. "Titid" and the Lavalas Movement Between 1985 and 1990, Haiti became
submerged in a national power vacuum and a cauldron of turmoil workers strikes, demonstrations
and conventions of opposition groups, shifts in the government, arrests and shootings, mass protests
and massacres as contending interests fought it out and political constellations took shape. In
1986 shortly after Baby Doc's departure, a Haitian told a foreign journalist: "We're glad Duvalier
is gone, but this is not the end of the affair, not by a long shot. The new government is perhaps a
necessary evil, but it is certainly not the choice of the people who struggled and sacrificed to get rid
of Duvalier."
Only a radical rupture with the structures of the past, this Haitian argued, could extract Haiti from
continual political and social crisis. Ironically, the Haitian who made this comment would himself
come to symbolize just such a rupture: Father Aristide. At the time, the soft-spoken Catholic priest
was unknown outside of Haiti. But from his parish in the teeming Cite Soleil slum of Port-au-Prince,
the proponent of liberation theology became the indisputable leader of Haiti's struggle for popular
democracy. Aristide, widely known by his nickname "Titid" ("little Aristide"), had emerged as a
voice for change, a symbol of the vision of a new Haiti. Consequently, he was targeted for repeated
assassination attempts, including the September 1988 attack on his church, which was burned to the
ground by the army and paramilitary forces. And as the representative of the popular sectors that
the US-sponsored "transition to democracy" was intended to suppress, Aristide also incurred the
wrath of Washington. US officials showed nothing but hostility toward Aristide between 1986-1990,
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portraying him as a dangerous demagogue and an "extremist" bent on opposing the democratic
process. From 1986 to 1989 the grassroots movement for popular democracy was transformed into a
mass revolt against the traditional structures of power and corruption.
By eliminating political parties, unions, media, and the rule of law, Duvalierism gave birth to new
forms of organization, based on loosely organized popular and civic groups operating largely
outside of the traditional political arena and independent from the country's major parties. In
early 1987, a total of 284 such national and local organizations came together to form the National
Congress of Democratic Movements (Konakom). Another multi-sectoral coalition, the Group of
57, came together in June of that year. The grassroots base of the Catholic Church, and particularly
the "Ti Legliz" (Christian Base Communities), played a major role in the popular movement. By
1990, Konakom and the Group of 57 had effectively joined forces, forming what became known
as the Lavalas movement ("flood" or "avalanche"). The movement brought together hundreds of
thousands, and later millions, of poor Haitians from the teeming urban slums and the impoverished
countryside. Lavalas became the political and electoral expression of all Haitians who aspired to
a fundamental break with the old order. Meanwhile, after three coups and the cancellation of two
scheduled elections, the transitional government that replaced Baby Doc, under the relentless
pressure of mass public demonstrations and US diplomatic leverage, finally allowed elections
scheduled for December 1990 to proceed. Distrust of formal political parties and of an electoral
process controlled from above led to a popular groundswell that rejected over 20 traditional
candidates as the elections approached. Instead, several dozen civic groups associated with the
Lavalas movement formed a loose center-to-left electoral coalition, the Front for National Change
and Democracy (FNCD).
The FNCD asked Aristide to run as its candidate. Within days of his nomination as presidential
candidate, two million Haitians, who had earlier shown little interest in the electoral process,
rushed to register, bringing the number of registered voters almost overnight from 40% to 90% of
the voting-age population. Titid won 67% of the vote, despite strong US support for Marc Bazin, a
former World Bank official and "moderate" technocrat who had been carefully groomed through
US political aid programs and was considered the front-runner until Aristide entered the race.
In the elections, Bazin only captured 14% of the vote. Taking place in the post-Cold War era, and
without formal links to traditional political parties (of the left or otherwise), much less to any foreign
powers, the popular revolt in Haiti in the late 1980s constituted a new and innovative form of social
mobilization.
The triumph of the Lavalas uprising represented a new option for the Haitian majority and also
new hope for the Third World. This was the first political revolution since the end of the Cold
War, and one whose democratic legitimacy could not possibly be called into question. Both the
elite and Washington were caught completely off guard by the Lavalas electoral victory. Bazin had
been seen as a shoo-in for what was to be an election with a small voter turnout and international
certification as "free and fair" until Aristide entered the race. Aristide was therefore the unexpected
and unwanted outcome of the "transition to democracy" the US had so arduously tried to facilitate.
The tasks faced by the new government were overwhelming: implementing popular reforms after
almost 200 years of entrenched corruption and dictatorship, reorganizing a chaotic and praetorian
state, applying sanctions to army officers for past abuses and coups, responding to the demands of
the continent's poorest population, and addressing one of the worst ecological crises in the Western
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Hemisphere that included near complete deforestation and soil depletion in the tiny country.
Among the programs begun by Aristide but undercut by the coup which overthrew him in Sept.
1991 was a national literacy campaign, plus an agrarian reform that would have set limits on the size
of property holdings, channeled resources to poor peasants, and redistributed available lands. A
communal reforestation program was also in the planning stages, as well as the institutionalization
of participatory democratic structures alongside the formal governmental apparatus.
Under the Aristide government, organizing became the word of the day among the popular sectors.
Popular organizations redoubled their activities and attracted new members. One US observer
touring Haiti under Aristide reported: "Everywhere we went we encountered a social movement
that is astounding in its depth and breadth." This newfound sense of hope and self- confidence
among the Haitian masses triggered a deep trepidation in the elite and their US backers. The 1991
Coup and the 1991-1994 Interim The question highest on the minds of observers after the 1990 vote
was how the US would respond. Having financed the electoral process, which was monitored by
over 1,000 foreign observers, including a team led by former president Jimmy Carter, Washington
had little choice but to recognize the Aristide government. But behind the scenes, US officials
demonstrated a pattern of increasing hostility and disapproval of Aristide. Then president George
Bush withheld disbursal of US$84 million in already appropriated economic aid because the
Aristide government had failed to meet several conditions attached to the aid package, among them,
certification by Washington that human rights were being respected (neither the Duvalier regime
nor the 1986-1990 military juntas suffered such a withholding of economic aid despite gross human
rights violations).
In fact, alleged human rights violations became the centerpiece of a US campaign to denigrate
Aristide's personal integrity and the legitimacy of his government a campaign which was intensified
following the coup. Gen. Raoul Cedras and the other military officers who led the September
1991 coup d'etat were figureheads for an alliance of old guard forces in the army and the elite.
These forces tolerated Aristide for seven months and feared that further consolidation of the
first democratic government in the country's history would irreversibly threaten their privileges.
The Washington Office on Haiti circulated a list after the coup of a dozen business leaders who
reportedly spent over US$40 million to back Aristide's ouster. However, there is no evidence of a
US role in the coup. In fact, evidence suggests that US policy-makers were pursuing an alternative,
three-pronged strategy for undermining popular democracy in Haiti: 1) withholding US aid and
applying a host of other economic, political and diplomatic pressures on the Aristide government;
2) vastly expanding political aid and "democracy promotion" programs to bolster Aristide's elite
opponents; and 3) strengthening countervailing institutional powers in the government, such as
the legislature, local government councils and the security forces, where the elite could exercise
influence over the presidency, if not veto its policies.
For instance, in May 1991 the State Department approved a massive US$24 million "Democracy
Enhancement Project" for Haiti designed to hasten the organization, institutional influence,
communications and political-action capacity of elite and anti-Aristide constituencies. "The Project
has been designed with a built-in flexibility to respond to the changing social, institutional and
political context for democracy-enhancement activities," stated an AID document on the program.
"The project constitutes our principal effort to advance the overriding objectives of US policy toward
Haiti." The coup, however, placed Washington in a difficult position. Aristide was the unexpected
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outcome of a transition that the US had tried unsuccessfully to guide, while the coup- makers and
backers the military and the elite were the traditional US allies in Haiti and were the recipients
of US economic, political and military aid from 1985-1991. But support for a military coup at a
time when Washington was promoting tightly managed "free elections" around the world as the
cornerstone of its new political intervention was out of the question. It could embolden militaries in
Latin America and elsewhere to attempt takeovers.
Demonstrating consistency in Haiti was clearly of critical importance for US policy-makers in
assuring the overall success of its "democracy promotion" strategy around the world. The Haitian
case became a test for US policy-makers. Infighting broke out in Washington over post-coup
Haiti policy. From Aristide's ouster in September 1991 up to the eve of the current occupation,
Washington became involved in a complex and sometimes contradictory effort to resolve its
dilemma in Haiti in a manner compatible with its overall "democracy promotion" strategy. At the
risk of simplification, US post-coup strategy attempted unsuccessfully for three straight years to
create and legitimize an elite civilian alternative to Aristide's government-in-exile.
One aspect of this strategy was searching for a formula under which Aristide would return as
a powerless and largely ceremonial president, under various euphemisms of "power sharing,"
"consensus government," and "reconciliation." Such an arrangement would give important quotas
of power to business and political elites and make it impossible for Aristide's government to fulfill
its promises to the impoverished Haitian majority of popular democracy and social change. The
other aspect was the repression and demobilization of the popular sectors inside Haiti, a process
which the military regime carried out with brutal efficiency. Some 5,000 people were killed by the
military regime, and several hundred thousand went into hiding or fled the country. "The goal of
the repression is two-fold," noted one international human rights report in 1993, "first, to destroy
the political and social gains made since the downfall of the Duvalier dynasty, and second, to
ensure that no matter what Haiti's political future may hold, all structures for duplicating those
gains will have been laid waste." US policy measures between 1991-1994 included a series of highly
duplicitous diplomatic undertakings whose ostensible purpose was to restore Aristide to office.
The July 1993 Governors Island Accord, for example, was imposed on Aristide under the threat
that the US would withdraw recognition of him if he did not sign. Other US measures throughout
this period include a refugee policy broadly condemned as inhumane and illegal, an intentionally
ineffective and unenforced embargo, the resumption, after a brief suspension, of the US$24 million
"Democracy Enhancement Program" for the elite, and a CIA campaign, publicly exposed in 1993,
to discredit Aristide. So why did this strategy fail? What led to the September 1994 invasion?
Explaining The Invasion Ultimately, the 1991-1994 US strategy of creating and legitimizing an elite
civilian alternative to Aristide failed for two overriding and interrelated reasons. First, try as it did,
Washington could not delegitimize Aristide and legitimize an alternative. It became evident that
any solution any hope of stabilizing Haiti would absolutely require his return. Second, and closely
related, the Haitian elite and the military rulers proved utterly intransigent regarding Aristide's
return.
The Clinton administration finally imposed effective sanctions in May 1994, including a ban on
civilian flights to and from Haiti, a closing of the porous Dominican border with Haiti, and a freeze
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on Haitian assets in the US. This "tough new policy" had the specific objective of applying pressure
on the elite to compromise with Aristide in the short term to get the US policy of undermining
popular democracy in Haiti back on track in the medium and long term. More precisely, the
tightening of the sanctions was intended to drive a wedge between the military and the elite and
to force the latter to withdraw its support for the military. Moreover, as long as the crisis remained
unresolved, the flow of refugees out of Haiti would continue to create diplomatic, political and
logistical problems for Washington.
And the Clinton administration had boxed itself into a domestic political corner, in which pressure
was mounting to move against the Cedras regime. The threat of an invasion was at first intended to
be only that a threat designed to increase pressure on the military regime to reach a Washingtonbrokered accommodation. In official parlance, this is known as "coercive diplomacy." But once the
threat was made, the Clinton administration ran the risk of losing considerable credibility, not just
regarding Haiti, but regarding overall US foreign policy, if it did not follow through. "War," once
observed the nineteenth-century Prussian military theorist, Karl von Clausewitz, "is the extension of
politics by other means."
Clausewitz's famous axiom goes far in explaining the US military intervention in Haiti. As events
fell more and more out of US control and options began to dwindle, Washington found itself unable
to pursue its goals through strictly political policy instruments. The occupation is but the extension
of its policy into the military realm. In this regard, the occupation sets a dangerous precedent by
legitimizing the use of military force to promote low- intensity democracy. It can be expected that
military force will in the future become more thoroughly integrated into programs to promote
polyarchy and suppress popular democracy. In synthesis, Washington's ten-year effort to bring
about a transition to low-intensity democracy in Haiti became derailed for several reasons.
First, the elite has been unable to rise above its internecine squabbling, corruption, and tendency
toward authoritarianism. As a consequence, a modernized, technocratic faction within the elite that
Washington has sought to develop with its "democracy promotion" programs has been unable to
come together. Second, the popular sectors were leading the country toward an outcome of popular
democracy with Aristide's election and with their own mass mobilization and organization. Third,
the military has shown that it was not willing to subordinate itself to elite civilian authority. Wither
the Occupation and US Policy? There are four key actors in the Haitian drama. The traditional
triangle of power is comprised of the US, the elite, and the military. The fourth actor, opposed to this
triangle of power, are the Haitian popular sectors.
The US objective in Haiti, from its occupation earlier this century until the current occupation,
has always been predicated on an alliance with the tiny elite and the defense of an exclusionary
social order in Haiti. What has changed, starting with the removal of Duvalier and continuing with
the present occupation, has not been this fundamental objective, but redefinition of the triangular
relation of power. Washington's "democracy promotion" project requires subordinating the military
to civilian elites who are committed to a system of low-intensity democracy rather than corrupt
authoritarianism. But the project does not contemplate doing away with a repressive apparatus. To
the contrary, the armed forces, as long as they are subordinate to the elite and the project of lowintensity democracy, remain crucial for social control and suppression of popular sectors, within the
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bounds of a constitutional framework. This is why the agreement brokered by Jimmy Carter called
for US and Haitian military forces to "work together," and why Cedras went, in a period of days,
from being a "ruthless killer" to a "military leader concerned with his country."
While some of the notorious paramilitary forces have been disbanded, the US plan does not call
for a purge or the dissolution of the army but for its reorganization into a "professional" force
properly defending a system of low- intensity democracy rather than promoting corruption and
authoritarianism. And the US continues to reiterate that the Haitian police force (which is under
army jurisdiction) bears the primary responsibility for "crowd control." Indeed, the traditional role
of the only two military units completely dismantled by Marines the artillery and naval units has
not been internal social control but that of providing support to one or another faction of the elite in
their bids to overthrow the government-of-the-day and take over. By dismantling these units, and
thereby eliminating the capacity of any one elite clique to call on the military to help it carry out a
coup, US forces have done nothing but strengthen the basis upon which a civilian polyarchic system
can be constructed among the elite.
And true to Washington's original script, Aristide will return as a largely lame-duck president
who, in any event, must step down after elections scheduled for December 1995, having spent the
vast majority of his presidency in exile. Moreover, by being returned to office by US Marines, he
is beholden to the very same foreign power that has consistently sought to defuse the popular
project that he leads. The Lavalas movement has been forced to accept the piper of US military
intervention, thus leaving US policy-makers and strategists in a much stronger position to call
the Lavalas movement's and the country's political tune. New political aid programs designed to
secure the elusive goal of forging a modern elite capable of competing with the popular sectors are
already underway, including a multimillion dollar program for the upcoming December legislative
elections, to be handled by the AID and several groups tied to the NED. More ominously, Clinton
has reportedly approved a US$5 million CIA program for unspecified "political activities" in Haiti.
US intervention and penetration of Haiti's political system and civil society can be expected to
escalate as next year's general elections approach. For Washington, the "best- case" scenario
will be a presidential victory by a technocrat from the elite in those elections. But according
to Washington's script, even if Port-au- Prince mayor Paul Evans or another figure nominally
associated with the Lavalas movement wins the next presidential elections, the Haitian political
landscape on the heels of three years of military dictatorship, a prolonged US occupation,
institutional changes, and the strength of elite economic control and influence over countervailing
government powers will have been so thoroughly transformed that the possibilities of real social
change will be severely restricted, if not impossible.
In sum, the occupation is an Alice's Wonderland: things are not what they seem, at first blush, to
be. The occupation has the image of a clash between a liberating foreign force and a corrupt local
ruling class. In reality, it is the sealing of a long-term pact between that foreign force and the Haitian
elite. There is, however, a wild card in the script: the popular Haitian masses. Their honeymoon with
the occupation force will continue just as long as the tactical convergence lasts over the removal
of the Cedras regime. Emboldened by the imminent removal of the regime and return of Aristide,
the Haitian majority has already resumed its struggle for popular democracy. Should the military
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occupation persist, it will be only a matter of time before the occupation force becomes the open
guardian of the elite and moves from liberator to oppressor.

-- End --
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